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tionary model is seen as an integral 
part of that success. And then, there’s 
climate change, where the EU member 
states were not only early ratiﬁers of 
the Kyoto Protocol but have developed 
a continental emissions trading scheme 
as well.
But there’s another side, too. The 
United States’ risk-based system 
evolved because precaution didn’t al-
low a strong enough role for science in 
decisionmaking, some would argue, 
and thus made government interfer-
ence in the market seem arbitrary and 
unjustiﬁed. While Congress may have 
been largely silent in lawmaking, the 
agencies have been busy in numerous 
areas. And then there are the advan-
tages of the federalism and market-
based approaches that highlight U.S. 
policy today.
Unfortunately, invitations extended 
to the U.S. government to participate 
were declined at the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the White House 
Council on Environmental Quality. 
Our debate on “Who’s Ahead?” is set in an era when Europe is expanding both in geography 
and regulation. A highly touted recent 
example of the latter is the EU’s nascent 
REACH chemical registration and eval-
uation program, which would address 
chemicals that have been on the market 
for years, as well as new chemicals and 
signiﬁcant new uses. But only 10 or 15 
years ago, from the U.S. vantage, Euro-
pean national environmental laws were 
often seen as modeled after the United 
States’, but not as advanced, especially 
in implementation. The United States 
had also developed a sophisticated 
risk-based approach while Europeans 
used a simpler precautionary model.
During a decade or more in which 
Congress has all but stopped environ-
mental lawmaking, however, European 
nations have completed their coales-
cence into the European Union and 
enacted some of the most stringent and 
innovative environmental regulatory 
programs in the world. The precau-
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and the public through citizen 
suits. The authority granted to ad-
ministrative agencies to interpret 
environmental statutes, reinforced 
by the Supreme Court’s Chevron 
decision, has led to a process of 
ﬁne-tuning and the evolution of 
a realistic, efﬁcient, and ﬂexible 
method of regulation. 
In contrast, the EU environmen-
tal management system is in its 
infancy. The EU Liability Directive 
for environmental damage does 
not enter into force until 2007. The 
EU Registration, Evaluation and 
Authorization of Chemicals, or 
REACH, initiative remains simply 
a proposal. Moreover, the recent, 
derived nature of European feder-
alism generates constant tension 
between member states and the 
multinational governmental in-
stitutions. The U.S. constitutional 
system of  federalism, on the other 
hand, recognizes that states are a 
partner in administering environ-
mental laws because harms are 
often best addressed at the local 
level. 
An illustrative example of 
the differences between the two 
regimes is the manner in which 
they each regulate chemicals. The 
U.S. maintains a layered system 
of protection from the potential 
harms that chemicals may cause. 
The centerpiece of the U.S. chemi-
cal policy is the Toxic Substances 
Control Act. Enacted in 1976, 
TSCA provides broad powers to 
EPA to regulate chemicals which 
present an unreasonable risk of in-
jury to health or the environment 
and to take action with respect to 
substances which are imminent 
hazards. Through administrative 
law and a risk reduction strategy, 
EPA has allowed low risk chemi-
cals onto the market in controlled 
and limited situations while ad-
ditional data is developed. TSCA 
is buttressed by additional federal 
regulatory systems for particular 
chemicals, such as pesticides or 
drugs. State tort laws comple-
ment TSCA by subjecting hazard-
ous chemicals to product liability 
lawsuits. These overlapping legal 
mechanisms provide an effective 
full-court defense to potential 
harmful chemicals.
The EU chemical proposal, 
REACH, shifts the burden on 
companies to ensure the safety of 
chemicals. REACH’s over reliance 
on precaution will preclude some 
beneﬁcial chemicals from making 
it to market without adequate sci-
ence to support such prohibition. 
Nightmarish bureaucratic paper-
work and heavy costs imposed on 
businesses for testing, document-
ing, and recordkeeping will stiﬂe 
many new developments. The lack 
of clarity regarding REACH’s risk 
standards will cause the misalloca-
tion of resources on less harmful 
chemicals. The absence of a well-
developed administrative agency 
will result in inconsistency in 
REACH’s implementation among 
regulated companies. Although 
the proposed program contains 
ambitious legislative declarations, 
one must remain skeptical and 
wait for implementation. Under 
the current proposal, it appears 
that REACH has practical prob-
lems which will take years to cure.
The 21st century brings new 
technologies and new pollution 
concerns. Although it can be 
tempting to ban something out-
right in the name of precaution, as 
Chief Justice Warren Burger aptly 
noted, “Perfect safety is a chimera; 
regulation must not strangle hu-
man activity in the search for the 
impossible.” The well-developed 
use in the U.S. of administrative 
law and cooperative federalism 
provides the framework for the 
appropriate balance between risk 
management and precaution. 
This balance makes the U.S. better 
equipped to address new pollution 
concerns and to continue to lead 
the world in realistic environmen-
tal management.
Michael S. Caplan is an attorney 
in the Environmental Department of 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. He is 
an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown 
University Law Center, where he 
teaches a course comparing regulation 
of chemicals, biotech, and nanotech in 
the U.S. and EU. He can be reached at 
mcaplan@willkie.com.
U.S.: Realistic 
Balance Of Risk 
And Precaution
MICHAEL S. CAPLAN
Waiving high the ﬂag of the precautionary principle, the European Union 
asserts it is now more innova-
tive than the United States in its 
environmental management. But 
when asking “Who’s Ahead?”, 
we ought not buy into the notion 
that “ahead” is measured by the 
most ambitious system. Rather, 
the system that is ahead should be 
measured by the reality of envi-
ronmental protection identiﬁed at 
the ground level. 
The reality is that the United 
States has a proven track record of 
environmental accomplishments 
and maintains certain advantages 
over the comparable EU system. 
The U.S. chronological lead in 
environmental management has 
allowed it to develop expert ad-
ministrative agencies and imbue 
such agencies with the authority to 
interpret and implement environ-
mental statutes. This provides the 
U.S. with the ability to adapt more 
quickly without having to create 
entire new statutory regimes when 
new pollution concerns develop. 
Moreover, the long-standing sys-
tem of federalism in the U.S. cre-
ates a system of partnership, with 
the states and federal government 
working together to form a com-
prehensive environmental regime. 
With its industrial base virtually 
untouched after World War II, the 
U.S. was faced with modern-era 
environmental problems prior to 
the EU. Public outcry regarding 
pollution, such as Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring, forced the U.S. to 
address environmental problems 
decades earlier than its European 
counterparts. U.S. environmental 
statutes have been tested and re-
vised over the decades not only by 
the three branches of the federal 
government, but also by the states 
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U.S. Changed 
Course, And EU 
Surged Forward
ROBERT DONKERS
First, we need to get rid of a few over-simpliﬁcations — namely that Europe regu-
lates while the United States relies 
on market forces, and that the EU 
applies precaution where the U.S. 
relies on risk assessments.
Europe’s regulatory approach is 
sometimes regarded as top-down, 
command-and-control, inﬂexible, 
and lacking transparency, but this 
is not correct. The 25 EU member 
states are not easily commanded 
by Brussels! However, once com-
mon EU standards are adopted, 
they apply across the EU, which 
provides transparency and a level 
playing ﬁeld. Furthermore, the Eu-
ropean Commission engages more 
and more in open dialogue, in-
volving stakeholders and provid-
ing extended (economic) impact 
assessments with its proposals. 
The worldwide internet consulta-
tion on the proposal for REACH, 
the new EU chemicals policy and 
legislation, is one example. 
Also, the EU is increasingly 
using market-based instruments 
(such as the Emission Trading 
Scheme for CO2 allowances), as 
well as voluntary schemes, infor-
mation, and awareness-raising, in 
a policy mix with regulation. Just 
as the U.S. environmental toolkit 
does not just contain litigation and 
voluntary initiatives, the European 
toolkit does not just contain legis-
lation. 
Finally, the EU’s use of the 
Precautionary Principle is also a 
subject of misunderstanding. The 
Precautionary Principle is a tool 
available to decisionmakers when 
faced with potentially harmful and 
irreversible effects on the environ-
ment or health and when there is 
no full scientiﬁc certainty concern-
ing the nature or extent of the risk. 
The Precautionary Principle is not 
a substitute or excuse for seeking 
zero risk, and its application is 
ﬁrmly based on risk assessments 
and available scientiﬁc informa-
tion. It is carefully used and on a 
case by case basis.
Where are we today? From 
the 1970s to the beginning of the 
1990s, the U.S. was widely recog-
nized as a world leader on envi-
ronmental issues. Domestically, 
it developed a robust environ-
ment policy including standards. 
Some policy elements and many 
standards were followed abroad, 
including in Europe. The U.S. 
pursued a strong enforcement 
policy. And the U.S. was a strong 
proponent of international action 
to protect the environment and 
played an important role in lead-
ing the world to agree to the 1987 
Montreal Protocol to protect the 
ozone layer.
In the 1970s, the European 
environment policy was just start-
ing, with its ﬁrst multi-year action 
program (presented in 1973) and 
with mainly ad hoc measures on 
water pollution, waste issues, and 
car emissions. 
Things changed. At the Earth 
Summit in June 1992, the U.S. 
shifted course on environment 
initiatives, giving priority to eco-
nomic and trade issues, followed 
by initiatives to roll back legisla-
tion domestically. 
But in Europe, with increasing 
environment problems, recogni-
tion of environment NGOs, and 
with Green political parties com-
ing up (in for example Germany), 
a stronger environment policy 
developed at both the national 
and European levels, carefully 
integrated and coordinated with 
other policies, such as industry, 
energy, transport, trade, and social 
policies. Nowadays, EU policy 
elements including product and 
emission standards, for instance 
on car emissions, are being intro-
duced in many non-EU countries.
What are possible reasons for 
those different evolutions in poli-
cy? It would take too long to detail 
the reasons for differences, but a 
few should be brieﬂy mentioned. 
Europe ﬁrmly believes that only a 
multilateral approach is effective 
in addressing problems such as 
climate change and global envi-
ronmental degradation. Thus, the 
EU promotes strong international 
agreements and delivers on them. 
Europeans are more skeptical 
than Americans that technological 
advance through market forces 
will solve our environmental prob-
lems. The EU shares the view that 
technology is a key tool to ﬁnd 
solutions, but a regulatory frame-
work is needed to trigger the tech-
nology in time. 
Cultural and demographic 
dimensions may also play a role. 
The EU 25 has 460 million inhabit-
ants and the U.S. has 300 million 
on twice the land mass. There are 
many more people per square mile 
in Europe. Environment problems 
are felt everywhere and trigger 
cross-boundary action.
The U.S. is still ahead of Europe 
in applying market based instru-
ments, but the EU is catching up. 
The U.S. has more experience with 
enforcing federal legislation than 
in the comparable EU-level situ-
ation, where only recently have 
ﬁnancial penalties been added to 
existing legal instruments. But 
today, many EU standards are 
regularly becoming global stan-
dards. Concerning international 
leadership on environment issues, 
the EU has clearly ﬁlled the gap 
the U.S. has voluntarily left.
At the end of the day, it is not 
very relevant from an environ-
ment perspective who is ahead on 
one issue or the other. Only when 
the U.S. and the EU, the world’s 
largest economies, work together 
can we tackle the very complex 
challenges — from climate change 
to adequate clean drinking water 
— the world is facing.  
Robert Donkers is Environment 
Counselor at the Delegation of the 
European Commission to the United 
States in Washington, D.C. 
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EU: Burden Of 
Proof Shifted To 
Chemical Maker
MEGHAN PURVIS
When it comes to protect-ing public health from toxic chemicals, the 
European Union has trumped the 
United States. Take chemicals as 
an example, my area of expertise. 
Many point to the differences of 
our basic regulations for toxic 
chemicals — the United States’ 
risk-based approach versus the 
European Union’s blossoming 
precautionary focus. All of this 
is certainly true, but the failure 
of U.S. chemicals policy goes far 
beyond risk versus precaution. 
The Toxic Substances Control 
Act is fundamentally ﬂawed in 
three ways: First, for the chemicals 
on the market before TSCA passed, 
EPA assumes they are safe unless 
proven otherwise. According to 
the Government Accountability 
Ofﬁce, EPA has crumbled under 
this burden of proving negative 
health effects. EPA has evalu-
ated fewer than 200 of the 62,000 
chemicals that were on the market 
when TSCA passed, and regulated 
only ﬁve.
Second, TSCA manages rather 
than prevents health risks, even 
when there’s credible evidence 
that harm may occur from expo-
sure to a chemical. When regula-
tors are forced to assess risk, they 
often spend years guesstimating 
the relative odds that a chemical’s 
toxicity combined with the aver-
age person’s exposure levels will 
cause harm. The regulators then 
attempt to keep the risk to an “ac-
ceptable” level.
In reality, this is nearly an im-
possible task. New information 
about low-dose exposures, as well 
as unknown impacts of additive 
exposures, makes estimating and 
calculating an average exposure 
to one chemical rather pointless. 
Rather than managing risk, regula-
tors should assess chemicals based 
on their known hazardous proper-
ties, such as their persistence in 
our bodies or carcinogenicity, and 
phase out the most problematic 
chemicals for less hazardous alter-
natives.
Finally, the monetary burden of 
assessing chemical safety falls on 
taxpayers, not chemical compa-
nies. Since EPA has to meet a high 
burden of proof to label a chemi-
cal hazardous, the agency has to 
spend hundreds of thousands of 
taxpayer dollars on testing and 
analysis. In its 1998 review of high 
production volume chemicals, EPA 
estimated the cost for a full round 
of basic screening tests, includ-
ing tests for reproductive and 
developmental toxicity, at about 
$205,000 per chemical. The chemi-
cal industry, which reports proﬁts 
of about $17 billion per year and 
beneﬁts ﬁnancially from the chem-
icals on the market, should pay 
this price to protect public health.
The REACH proposal in the 
European Union shifts this bur-
den, requiring manufacturers to 
provide health and safety infor-
mation and providing incentives 
for the industry to switch to safer 
alternatives.
In the United States, stop-gap 
voluntary agreements between 
industry and regulators domi-
nate federal action on chemicals 
— proving that U.S. toxics policy 
is broken. Most recently, EPA 
reached a voluntary agreement 
with DuPont and other companies 
to virtually eliminate PFOA, a by-
product of non-stick coatings such 
as Teﬂon, by 2015. A few weeks 
later, EPA’s science advisory board 
recommended that PFOA be con-
sidered a likely carcinogen. Under 
U.S. law, however, EPA is not re-
quired to act on this information. 
Instead, the victims of PFOA must 
hope that DuPont, the same com-
pany that was ﬁned $16.5 million 
for hiding damning information 
about its proﬁtable chemical, keep 
its word.
This voluntary tactic also fails 
to take a systematic approach to 
chemicals management, allow-
ing companies to shift from one 
problematic chemical to another. 
The U.S. government’s failure to 
take action on another class of 
chemicals, phthalates, provides a 
clear example. Phthalates are plas-
ticizers that have been linked to 
developmental and reproductive 
defects. In response to a petition 
from environmental and consumer 
groups, the U.S. government asked 
toy manufacturers to voluntarily 
remove DINP, one type of phthal-
ate, from children’s teethers and 
other mouthing toys. In 2005, U.S. 
PIRG tested several soft plastic 
baby toys and teethers; we found 
that while none contained DINP, 
many contained other phthalates, 
including three that have been 
banned in all toys and childcare 
articles in the European Union. 
This calls into question not only 
the utility of voluntary industry 
agreements but the efﬁcacy of 
a one-chemical-at-a-time toxics 
policy. 
Not everyone in the U.S. gov-
ernment is content with a broken 
regulatory scheme. Last summer, 
public health-conscious members 
of Congress introduced the Kids 
Safe Chemicals Act. This legisla-
tion would reform TSCA and 
establish a regulatory system that 
requires chemicals to be proven 
safe before they are put on the 
market. Americans deserve noth-
ing less. 
Meghan Purvis is an Environmen-
tal Health Advocate with U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group in Washing-
ton, D.C.
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EU’s Aspiration 
Trumped By U.S. 
Implementation
ERNIE ROSENBERG
Comparing environmental protection in the European Union and the United States 
is not straightforward. There are 
aspects of environmental protec-
tion laws that are superior in 
the United States and aspects of 
European law that are superior 
as written, though often not as 
implemented. On balance, the U.S. 
system is designed to deliver bet-
ter results more reliably.
In discussing this issue, we 
need to address two types of envi-
ronmental laws, pollution control 
(air and water pollution and waste 
management) and materials man-
agement. 
In pollution control, there is a 
wide range in the performance of 
the various member states of the 
European Union. The EU uses two 
types of instruments for its laws 
in this area: directives and regula-
tions. The former require national 
implementing legislation, while 
the latter are directly enforceable. 
In the Nordic states and other 
countries in Northern Europe, 
there is generally compliance by 
the countries in the issuance of 
laws to implement EU directives. 
Indeed, in the Nordic countries, 
there are often environmental re-
quirements that exceed those im-
posed by the EU.
In other parts of Europe, par-
ticularly in the southern countries 
and the areas formerly under Sovi-
et control (including East Germa-
ny), many environmental require-
ments are either not in place or are 
not being enforced aggressively.
The variation among the coun-
tries is possible because the Euro-
pean Union’s legal structures and 
processes provide far less compli-
ance assurance than in the United 
States. The distance between what 
is nominally required in the EU 
and what is actually imposed on 
the ground can be very large. Even 
when there is commitment by a 
member state to an environmental 
requirement, it is relatively free to 
make exceptions and otherwise 
minimize the adverse economic 
effects that full compliance would 
cause.
A case in point is the Kyoto Pro-
tocol for the control of greenhouse 
gases. If the U.S. were a signa-
tory, there would be facility-spe-
ciﬁc quantitative emission limits, 
backed up by operating permits 
(and perhaps new source permits). 
Continuous emissions monitoring 
would probably be required. Very 
importantly, the government could 
not weaken or defer the require-
ments for some facilities because 
of the transparency of our sys-
tem, public participation, and the 
potential for citizen suits both to 
compel strict implementation and 
to enforce emission limits directly.
The European Commission has 
itself often found compliance by 
member countries severely want-
ing. In the EU, countries often ﬁrst 
must be made to comply, then that 
compliance must ﬂow through to a 
facility or even an entire industrial 
sector. That is in reality more of a 
political than a legal process. In 
some countries, the national com-
mitment to compliance is ques-
tionable, so compliance by their 
industries, let alone individual 
facilities, has to be doubted.
In most EU countries, there 
is little transparency and no au-
thority for citizen suits. National 
authorities can and do make ex-
ceptions, relax or defer require-
ments, or simply fail to look for 
violations. This allows Europe to 
set loftier goals in its laws because 
costs and feasibility can be ad-
dressed in the implementation 
process.
In the case of materials controls 
(such as the Toxic Substances 
Control Act and the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act), the comparison would be 
to the EU’s forthcoming omnibus 
chemical management regulation, 
REACH. REACH will unquestion-
ably be more stringent than TSCA. 
TSCA, particularly as it applies 
to existing chemicals, is roundly 
criticized. But much of what such 
a chemical control law would be 
expected to accomplish is, in the 
U.S., accomplished by voluntary 
action, albeit often because of the 
prospect of product liability. In Eu-
rope, product liability is not nearly 
the threat that it is in the U.S. and 
chemical control varies widely 
from one country to another.
The EU’s ability or willingness 
to implement REACH as written is 
yet to be proved. Most important-
ly, the EU’s processes will allow 
the regulation to be implemented 
selectively so that some sort of 
compliance will be feasible.
Europe’s environmental laws 
are often characterized as aspi-
rational. Members of the EU do 
pursue the goals of their laws 
(mostly), but the letter of the law 
is applied with great ﬂexibility. 
If, as in the U.S., the EU had our 
regulatory processes, our citizen 
suit authority, and our product 
liability system, the nominal strin-
gency of its laws would have to be 
revisited. In the U.S., compliance 
with our laws is much closer to 
nominal. What is promised to the 
public is, for the most part, deliv-
ered. Our laws may in some cases 
appear to be less stringent, but the 
protection the environment gets is 
often better.
Ernie Rosenberg is President and 
Chief Executive Ofﬁcer of the Soap 
and Detergent Association in Wash-
ington, D.C..
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ﬁrmed the theoretical link to ozone 
depletion. The U.S. also phased 
out lead in gasoline before Europe 
did. Precaution is espoused in key 
U.S. statutes, including the Clean 
Air Act and the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. The U.S. adopted earlier 
and more stringent restrictions on 
ﬁne particulate matter and diesel 
emissions, in both the Clinton and 
current Bush administrations. In 
response to the European epidem-
ic of mad cow disease, the U.S. 
has banned British beef since 1989, 
whereas the EU did not do so until 
1996, and then removed that ban 
three years later. Further, in 1999 
and 2001 the U.S. FDA adopted 
“Precautionary Measures” ban-
ning blood donations by people 
who have spent a few months in 
Britain or a few years in Europe 
since 1980 — earlier and far strict-
er than in Europe, despite little 
evidence of mad cow transmission 
via blood, and despite the coun-
tervailing risk of hospital blood 
shortages. 
Thus the cases point both ways. 
But these competing cases are not 
an adequate basis for overall com-
parisons. Cherry-picking selective 
examples does not support conclu-
sions about the general pattern. 
Hasty comparisons are vulnerable 
to the heuristic errors of paying 
disproportionate attention to re-
cent, highly visible events, and 
exaggerated distinctions between 
groups that are actually similar.  
To overcome these limitations, 
we undertook a multi-year study 
of a broadly representative sam-
ple. We identiﬁed the 2,878 risks 
mentioned in the relevant litera-
ture in the U.S. and Europe from 
1970-2004. From this universe, 
we selected a random sample of 
100 risks and scored the relative 
precaution in U.S. and European 
regulations for each over the past 
35 years. As reported in the article 
by Hammitt, Wiener, Swedlow, 
Kall & Zhang in Risk Analysis, 
October 2005, we found less than 
a 6 percent difference in average 
relative precaution over the pe-
riod. Neither the cultural nor the 
reversal hypothesis was supported 
by the data.
The real pattern, then, is not the 
precautionary principle, it is pre-
cautionary particularity. Our broad 
analysis reveals that the U.S. and 
Europe exhibit general transatlan-
tic parity, punctuated by diver-
gences on a few speciﬁc risks, with 
each side acting more aggressively 
in some cases. The interesting 
question is not who is ahead, but 
why the U.S. and EU sometimes 
select such different worries.
The EU is now moderating its 
commitment to precaution, in 
favor of greater emphasis on the 
“proportionality principle” and 
the concomitant treaty require-
ment to assess “the potential ben-
eﬁts and costs of action or lack of 
action.” In February 2000, the Eu-
ropean Commission reclaimed the 
precautionary principle as part of 
decision analysis, requiring it to be 
based on scientiﬁc risk assessment 
and beneﬁt-cost analysis. The EU’s 
initiative on policy Impact As-
sessment, launched in 2001, was 
reinforced with revised guidelines 
issued in 2005 by the new Barroso 
Commission. The result is that EU 
policy is now converging toward 
the same analytic tools used in the 
U.S. to evaluate new regulations. 
And the legal context, such as 
tougher U.S. enforcement and tort 
liability, may narrow any asymme-
try in regulatory standards.
Risk regulation is a multifaceted 
terrain on which no single race is 
being run. Rather than debating 
who is ahead, we should be learn-
ing from policy experimentation, 
evaluation, and borrowing. We 
should be identifying better laws, 
not just more laws. Instead of a 
race to the top, the United States 
and the EU should be developing 
a transatlantic policy laboratory.
Jonathan B. Wiener is Perkins 
Professor of Law and Environmental 
Policy at Duke University, a Univer-
sity Fellow at Resources for the Fu-
ture, and visiting professor at EHESS 
and CIRED in Paris.




Is Europe now ahead of the United States in environmental protection? The answer is that a 
simplistic sports metaphor cannot 
do justice to the complex reality of 
transatlantic risk regulation. 
It is certainly true that in re-
cent years several highly visible 
European policies have been 
more precautionary than their 
U.S. counterparts — earlier in 
anticipation of emerging risks, or 
more stringent, or both. Among 
these are European Union policies 
restricting hormones in beef and 
genetically modiﬁed foods, regu-
lating greenhouse gases, and the 
new REACH chemicals program. 
In each of these cases, the United 
States has demurred. Moreover, 
Europe has formally adopted the 
precautionary principle in its trea-
ties and national laws, while the 
U.S. has not. 
Based on this evidence that 
Europe is “ahead,” some observers 
laud European leadership while 
others criticize European overreg-
ulation. Analysts seek to explain 
the alleged pattern as the result of 
underlying culture — European 
risk-aversion versus American 
risk-taking — or, by contrast, as 
the result of a reversal in position 
from greater U.S. precaution in the 
1970s to greater European precau-
tion today. The reversal hypothesis 
highlights the slowdown in new 
lawmaking in the U.S. Congress, 
and the accretion of EU regulatory 
institutions, since 1990.
But this evidence of greater 
European precaution, drawn from 
a few visible policies, is not the 
whole story. Other cases point in 
the opposite direction, of greater 
relative U.S. precaution. For ex-
ample, the U.S. began phasing out 
CFCs a decade before Europe, and 
years before observations con-
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